We present a new axiomatization of the deontic fragment of Anderson's relevant deontic logic, give an Andersonian reduction of a relevant version of Mally's deontic logic previously discussed in this journal, study the effect of adding propositional quantification to Anderson's system, and discuss the meaning of Anderson's propositional constant in a wide range of Andersonian deontic systems.
Introduction
An Andersonian system of deontic logic is a system in which the deontic operator O ("it is obligatory that") is defined by O A = e ⇒ A, where e is a primitive propositional constant ("the good thing") and ⇒ is an implicational connective. The following systems are examples of Andersonian deontic systems.
1. The systems discussed in [1] and [2] , in which ⇒ is strict implication, that is, O A = (e → A), where is the modal operator of necessity and → is material implication. 2. Anderson's relevant deontic logic ( [3] , [4] ), in which ⇒ is relevant implication. 3 . The systems discussed in [8] and [14] , in which ⇒ is strict relevant implication, that is, O A = (e → A), where is necessity and → is relevant implication.
In this paper, we will present some new results on Andersonian deontic systems. We start with Anderson's relevant deontic logic. We give a new axiomatization of the deontic fragment of this system, show that the relevant version of Mally's deontic logic [13] presented in [11] is an extension of this fragment, and prove that e can be defined in terms of O as soon as propositional quantification is available. After this, we discuss some of the other Andersonian systems mentioned above. We will show that the addition of propositional quantification sheds light on the meaning of the constant e in these systems, too.
Anderson's Relevant Deontic Logic
Definition 2.1 (System R) Relevant system R has the following axioms and rules ( [5] , Ch. V).
Definition 2.2 (System R e ) Anderson's relevant deontic logic R e is R with a primitive propositional constant e and a unary operator O defined by O A = e → A. Furthermore, the operator P is defined by P A = ¬O¬A. e is read as "the good thing," O as "it is obligatory that," and P as "it is permitted that." 1 
The Deontic Fragment of Anderson's Relevant Deontic Logic
To which "purely deontic" logic, stated in terms of O rather than e, does Anderson's proposal exactly give rise? This question has been answered by Goble [8] .
Definition 3.1 (System OR.1abc) Language: R supplemented with a primitive propositional operator O. Axioms and rules: R plus:
Definition 3.2 (Deontic Fragment)
The translation function h from the language of OR.1abc into the language of R e is defined as follows.
The deontic fragment of R e (under h) is the set {A : R e h(A)}.
Theorem 3.3 OR.1abc is an axiomatization of the deontic fragment of R e .
Proof By the Routley-Meyer semantics of R e and OR.1abc. See [8] for details. 2 This result can be simplified, as we will now show. 
Theorem 3.5 R O has the same theorems as OR.1abc.
Proof It is sufficient to prove that (ROa) is a derivable rule of R O and that (c), (OK), and (OC) are theorems of R O . The proofs are as follows. We mention a few intermediate theorems for later reference. To avoid circularity, there are no forward references in this section.
6, (c) This completes the proof. In contrast with Goble's system OR.1abc, systems R O and positive R O are well axiomatized in the sense that the axioms are independent from each other (proof: by MaGIC [18] ).
Mally's Deontic Logic
In an earlier paper [11] , we presented the following relevant version of Ernst Mally's deontic logic, the first formal system of deontic logic ever put forward [13] . Definition 4.1 (System RD (Relevant Deontik)) Language: relevant system R supplemented with a primitive unary operator O and a primitive propositional constant u ("the unconditionally obligatory"). Axioms and rules: R plus:
This system is the same as Mally's own system, except that Mally based his system on classical logic and accordingly accepted the "archetypical fallacy of relevance" A → (B → A). Mally's system has the theorem A ↔ O A (see [17] ), but neither A → O A nor O A → A are theorems of RD (proof: by MaGIC [18] ). It can be shown that RD can be axiomatized more elegantly as follows (see [12] in combination with the derivation of theorem (OC) above).
¬(u → O¬u) From the results we have presented above, it follows that RD is the deontic fragment of R e with an additional propositional constant u plus the axioms e → u and ¬(u → (e → ¬u)).
This result is useful because it makes it considerably easier to recognize some theorems of RD as such. For example, in [11] we failed to see that O O A → O A is a theorem, whereas we can now easily identify it as a theo-
, is just an instance of Contraction.
Propositional Quantification (1)
What does the propositional constant e exactly mean? The following interpretations have been offered: "the good thing" or "good state of affairs" ( [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] ), "what morality requires" [10] , "optimality or admissibility" [7] , "the content of an (unspecified) moral code" [19] , "the law," 6 "it is not the case that all hell breaks loose" [20] , "all normative demands are met" [16] . Most of these interpretations sound like poetry rather than logic. We shall show that once propositional quantifiers are added to R e , we can be more precise about the meaning of e. Definition 5.1 (System R ∀ p ) Propositionally quantified relevant system R ∀ p has the following axioms and axiom clause in addition to those of R ( [6] , Ch. VI).
If A is an axiom, then ∀ p A is an axiom.
Axioms Q1 and Q2 in conjunction with axiom clause Q * yield Generalization:
(Gen) If A is a theorem, then ∀ p A is a theorem.
Definition 5.2 (System
e is R ∀ p with primitive propositional constant e and propositional operators O and P defined as in R e .
Theorem 5.3 R
∀ p e has the following theorem: e ↔ ∀ p(O p → p).
Proof

1.
(
(e → e) self-impl 8.
((e → e) → e) → e 7, self-impl, permut 9.
Thus e says that all obligations are fulfilled (all normative demands are met). This happens to agree with McNamara's unmotivated informal reading of e [16] . 
The following derivation is similar to the proof of (OC) above. It is also similar to a well-known proof of the Barcan formula in individually quantified S5 ( [9] , p. 247).
1.
We might call this "a reduction of alethic logic to deontic logic."
Weaker Andersonian Systems
Some authors ( [8] , [15] , [14] ) have objected to axiom (b) and theorems (c), (Th1), and (Th2) of R O . An alternative approach in the Andersonian tradition is as follows ([8] , [14] ): start from R, add the modal operator of necessity and some axioms and rules for , add the constant e, and define O by O A = (e → A). In the resulting deontic systems, (b), (c), (Th1), and (Th2) are, in general, not derivable.
In the following, we shall study to which extent the results obtained for Anderson's relevant deontic logic are valid for these weaker systems.
Propositional Quantification (2)
Andersonian systems RT Vmo [14] and RT.a [8] have the following axiom and rule (among others) in addition to those of R, along with the just-mentioned definition of O:
If A is a theorem, A is a theorem.
Principles ( T) and (Nec) suffice to derive e ↔ ∀ p(O p → p) in the propositionally quantified versions of these Andersonian systems. The proof is as follows.
(e → e) self-impl, (Nec) 8.
( (e → e) → e) → e 7, self-impl, permut 9.
Most mixed alethic-deontic systems (both relevant and classical) discussed in the literature ( [7] , [8] ) have ( T) and are closed under (Nec), with the result that e ↔ ∀ p(O p → p) is a theorem of the propositionally quantified versions of these systems. It is appropriate to read e as "all obligations are fulfilled" in this whole range of systems. In weaker systems, however, one may have a greater freedom of interpretation.
Inverse Andersonian Reduction (2)
As before, we may ask whether we can carry out the inverse of the Andersonian reduction in the deontic fragments of these weaker Andersonian systems and define e in terms of O and the other connectives. The answer is affirmative, provided that one is considering sufficiently strong mixed alethic-deontic propositionally quantified systems.
Definition 9.1 (System RS4) Relevant alethic modal system RS4 has the following axioms and rules in addition to those of R.
If A is a theorem, then A is a theorem.
Definition 9.2 (System RS4 e ) System RS4 e has the same axioms and rules as RS4 but it also contains a primitive propositional constant e and a propositional operator O defined by O A = (e → A).
Definition 9.3 (System RS4 O ) Mixed alethic-deontic system RS4 O is RS4 supplemented with a primive operator O and the following axioms in addition to the axioms and rules of RS4.
The notion "deontic fragment" is defined as above (Definition 3.2), except that the clause for O is changed to h(O A) = (e → h(A)) and the clause h( A) = (h(A)) is added.
Theorem 9.4 RS4
O is an axiomatization of the deontic fragment of RS4 e .
Proof By the Routley-Meyer semantics of RS4 O and RS4 e . See [8] for details. 
Definition 9.5 (System RS4
∀
